



Managing Patterns of Internationalization, Integration, and Identity Transformation: 
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Abstract 
In this paper, we study the multifaceted transformation of an emerging market firm making 
multiple acquisitions. Drawing on a process study of an acquisitions program spanning two 
decades, we examine the post-acquisition internationalization, integration and organizational 
identity dynamics of an Arabian Gulf EMNC serial acquirer. We find that the serial acquisitions 
and post-acquisition integration were sufficiently profound and changing over time to create an 
organizational identity transformation in four phases: (1) diffusion, (2) consolidation, (3) 
restoration, and (4) reinvention. These phases further reflect an emergent business model 
centered on new resource allocations and innovation competencies as well as a new worldwide 
brand and revised value propositions. Our study enhances understanding of post-acquisition 
integration variations and programmatic expansion through acquisitions from emerging markets 
by proposing a post-acquisition metamorphosis perspective on internationalization from a region 
of the world relatively less-examined yet nevertheless of central economic importance from a 
global geopolitical resources perspective  
Keywords: post-acquisition integration; internationalization; acquisitions program; emerging 
markets; organizational identity; process research 
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Managing Patterns of Internationalization, Integration, and Identity Transformation: 
The Post-Acquisition Metamorphosis of an Arabian Gulf EMNC 
1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (henceforth M&As or acquisitions) are crucial ways in which firms 
can respond to changing environments (Capron, 1999; Swaminathan, Murshed & Hulland, 
2008), reconstitute their resources and business models, and increase future viability (Almor, 
Tarba & Margalit, 2014). Acquisitions as a phenomenon continue to grow globally in frequency 
and volume, also featuring cyclical developments known as M&A waves (Golbe & White, 1988; 
Harford, 2005). The global annual value of acquisitions exceeded $6.0T in 2015 and $4.7T in 
2016, amounts larger than the annual nominal GDP of all but the three largest economies in the 
world (Bloomberg, 2016; Bureau van Dijk, 2017; IMF, 2016). Each of the seven M&A waves 
that occurred during the overarching 1895-2017 time span arguably had a different financial, 
economic, and sociocultural basis (Alexandridis, Mavrovitis & Travlos, 2011; Auster & Sirower, 
2002; Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2001; KPMG, 2011). While the first three waves were largely 
constituted by US acquirers, European and Japanese firms increasingly entered the international 
M&A arena from the fourth wave onwards (Park & Gould, 2017). Since the fifth wave, the 
increasing diffusion of economic power across a broader range of countries has heightened 
opportunities for EMNCs to compete globally (Caiazza, Véry & Ferrara, 2017); firms from 
emerging economies have thus become prominent players in the worldwide market for corporate 
control (Luo & Tung, 2007; Madhok & Keyhani, 2012; Nair, Demirbag & Mellahi, 2015). 
Nonetheless, US and European samples still dominate acquisition research. Although country 
differences in regard to culture (e.g., Slangen, 2006; Bauer, Matzler & Wolf, 2016) or institutions 
(Capron & Guillen, 2009; Bauer, Schriber, Degischer & King, 2018) are investigated in relation 




acquisition behaviors have received less attention, and certain regions have been less examined. 
The Middle East evokes interest as a region to have notably increased in terms of acquisitions 
value and volume in recent years (Bureau van Dijk, 2017), as well as throughout the decade 
(UNCTAD, 2017). 
EMNCs strikingly pursue cross-border M&As to access developed economies, with the US, 
Canada, and EU being primary destinations targets due to their huge markets and many leading-
edge innovations (Caiazza et al., 2017; Liu & Deng, 2014; Weber & Tarba, 2014). Furthermore, 
EMNCs make overseas acquisitions to gain access to foreign markets and acquire know-how to 
boost their competitiveness at home and abroad (Kale & Singh, 2017). EMNC internationalizing 
acquisitions have been found to strengthen both the acquired developed country targets and the 
emerging market acquirers (Buckley, Elia & Kafouros, 2014)—either in terms of innovation 
performance benefits obtained through reverse technology flows (Nair et al., 2015; 2016; Nair, 
Demirbag, Mellahi & Pillai, 2017) or, more directly, through financial performance 
enhancement (Aureli, 2015). Amidst the innovation and internationalization changes, 
organizational identity impacts are another international acquisition issue. Organizational 
identity classically refers to those aspects of organizations that their constituents deem to be 
central, distinctive, and enduring (Albert & Whetten 1985). Inter-organizational interactions 
such as acquisitions can trigger organizational identity change, which has received scant 
attention in the literature (Clark, Gioia, Ketchen & Thomas, 2010). 
Acquisitions have long been studied from various angles, employing assorted theoretical lenses 
and methodologies (Meglio & Risberg, 2010). A compelling theme interconnecting the studies 
has been the high failure rates of acquisitions—reported to range between 40 and 60% (Homburg 
& Bucerius, 2005, 2006)—which has instigated many inquiries into acquisition performance and 




contribution to value creation (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Stahl et al., 2013; Stahl & Voigt, 
2008); this attention has prompted a vast array of studies investigating various facets of post-
acquisition integration. Integration extensiveness (Cording, Christmann & King, 2008; 
Homburg & Bucerius, 2005), models (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991), mechanisms (Larsson & 
Finkelstein, 1999), typologies (e.g., Shrivastava, 1983), and intercultural interactions (Weber, 
Tarba & Reichel, 2011) are examples of issues examined. The extant research has principally 
examined single acquisitions in cross-sectional approaches. Scant attention has been devoted to 
firms regularly engaging in acquisitions, although these serially acquiring firms have displayed 
increased survival rates (Almor et al., 2014). 
In acquisition programs, acquirers aim to reconfigure corporate assets and capabilities in order 
to execute strategy (Schipper & Thompson, 1983) suited to the business environment (Zheng, 
Yang & McLean, 2010). As the environment inevitably changes, both the acquisitive growth 
modes (Achtenhagen, Brunninge & Melin, 2017) and the acquisition programs change 
(Chatterjee, 2009). As a result, serial acquirers change not only in terms of business logic or firm 
size, but also in structure, coordination and control mechanisms, decision making styles, and 
assorted practices (Matzler, Uzelac & Bauer, 2014). We believe that querying how these 
issues—internationalization, acquisition and integration approaches, and organizational 
identity—co-evolve over time enriches our understanding of how serial acquirers implement an 
acquisitions program, alternate selected post-acquisition integration tactics, and change their 
organizational identities to meet competitive demands. Following studies on the organizational 
identity ramifications of strategic decision making (Gioia, Price, Hamilton & Thomas, 2010; 
Ravasi & Phillips, 2011; Ullrich, Wieseke & Van Dick, 2005; van Dick, Ullrich & Tissington, 
2006; van Knippenberg, Martin & Tyler, 2006), we assert that conducting a series of acquisitions 




With this paper, we contribute to M&A research in several ways. First, we examine how 
organizations and their identities morph through their acquisition activities (Achtenhagen et al., 
2017), and we illuminate how these changes interconnect with acquisition strategies and post-
acquisition integration approaches. The integration of perspectives (Larsson & Finkelstein, 
1999) in a field still characterized by fragmentation (Bauer & Matzler, 2014) helps us to 
understand the acquisitive development of an EMNC. To the best of our knowledge, our study 
is the first to focus on the long-term process of corporate development through an acquisitions 
program by investigating the constellation of previously separately issues. 
Second, we answer the enduring call for the adoption of a process research orientation (Jemison 
& Sitkin, 1986; Eisenhardt, Graebner & Sonenshein, 2016). Although cross-sectional research 
has dominated the field in analyzing inter-corporate combinations, it cannot fully capture the 
dynamism and the complexity of single acquisitions (Javidan, Pablo, Singh, Hitt & Jemison, 
2004; Meglio & Risberg, 2010) and especially not of acquisition programs. With this 
background in mind, we investigate two decades of serial acquisitions to unpack the variety in 
acquisition strategies, integration approaches, and organizational identity transformations.  
Third, we provide evidence from a less examined geographical context—the Arabian Gulf—
which is increasingly contributing to the global market for corporate control. We assert the 
significance of the Arabian Gulf not simply for being understudied and not only for being 
natural-resource and extractive energy-intensive, but also for having established a dramatic 
momentum with penetration of international markets. For instance, if the present rapid growth 
of the Chinese economy has been approximately 30 years in the making, the Arabian Gulf firm 
we study has expanded dramatically within a 20-year window, mirroring the trends of increasing 
privatization and outward FDI from the region. Hence, the present study contributes to a larger 




2. Theoretical Background 
We bridge three research streams—post-acquisition integration, acquisition programs, and 
organizational identity—underlying our question of how changes in an international acquisitions 
program and post-acquisition integration approaches affect organizational identity. 
2.1 Post-acquisition Integration 
Since before the 1970s and 1980s—from the merger miscarriage metaphor of Kitching (1967) 
to the cultural collision exposition of Sales and Mirvis (1984) and the seminal analysis of 
Shrivastava (1986)—and throughout the increasingly interdisciplinary perspectives of the 1990s 
(Datta, 1991; Reichheld & Henske, 1991; Schweiger & Walsh, 1990; Siehl & Smith, 1990), 
scholars have recognized the importance of post-acquisition integration in creating value from 
acquisitions. During integration, two formerly separate entities are realigned, resources 
redeployed, and redundancies eliminated (Cording et al., 2008; Homburg & Bucerius, 2006; 
Pablo, 1994) and two formerly distinct organizations—each with its own distinctive 
organizational identity—are combined (van Dick et al., 2006). 
Existing studies have investigated post-acquisition integration issues such as levels of integration 
(Shrivastava, 1986), degrees of integration (Pablo, 1994), types of integration—such as task and 
human (Birkinshaw, 1999)—or integration typologies (Angwin & Meadows, 2015; Haspeslagh 
& Jemison, 1991). As the extant work on typologies is either strictly conceptual or lacking strong 
empirical evidence (Angwin & Meadows, 2015), the findings on post-acquisition integration 
approaches often conflict. There is evidence of the beneficial effects of either a high degree of 
integration (Bauer & Matzler, 2014; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999) or a high level of autonomy 
(Capron, 2014; Paruchuri, Nerkar & Hambrick, 2006). This has led to a growing recognition that 
integration is more complex than was traditionally assumed (Graebner, 2004; Zaheer, Castañer 




business units/functions in the management of integration, we address limitations of the 
simplified extant typologies in integrating targets. Moreover, we need to recognize that what 
makes acquisitions work is not necessarily the opposite of what makes them fail. That is, 
problematic integration—for instance, missed cultural cues, loss of morale, operational 
inefficiencies, and loss of key customers and personnel—has been found to derail acquisitions, 
yet it is not exactly clear what creates an effective integration and successful acquisition 
outcomes (however those outcomes might be assessed). We enhance the understanding of 
integration as an acknowledged key phenomenon in the entire acquisitions process, one worthy 
of study from a process perspective in its own right, particularly intertwined with organizational 
identity issues and international acquisitions. 
Against the cross-sectional background of most previous research into individual acquisition 
integrations, we argue that we need to take a broader perspective on integration approaches. 
Given the relative paucity of research on acquisition programs, juxtaposed against the prevalence 
of programmatic acquisitions in practice, it is vital to understand that, when firms pursue 
acquisition series, integrative solutions need, first, to evolve as acquisition experience increases 
with a specific pattern, and, second, to change with the types of acquisitions within a series. In 
addition, programmatic acquisitions can be pursued in parallel as well as in series, and 
integrative solutions can then be fine-tuned even further—or at least become subject to additional 
scrutiny—than they would be in instances of more sequential acquisitions. These possibilities 
have motivated us to probe deeper into the domain of programmatic acquisitions and to highlight 
their interrelationship with post-acquisition integration approaches. 
2.2 From Single to Serial Acquisitions—The Evolution of a Programmatic Perspective 
Concomitant with the increasing reliance of companies on acquisitions to renew business models 




event within the broader repertoire of expansion options (Achtenhagen et al., 2017; Bertrand & 
Capron, 2015). The unit of analysis has begun to shift from single deals to entire acquisition 
programs (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). Traditionally, research addressing series of acquisitions has 
focused on the experience-propensity relationship (Kusewitt, 1985) or on learning-performance 
effects (Hayward, 2002). Although the latter relationship makes intuitive sense, research has 
yielded mixed results, ranging from positive (Barkema, Bell & Pennings, 1996), negative 
(Uhlenbruck, Hitt & Semadeni, 2006), U-shaped (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), or inverted 
U-shaped (Hayward, 2002), to non-significant (Zollo & Singh, 2004).  
Paralleling the diverse performance results achieved from serial acquisitions, research on serial 
acquirers has drawn on diverse conceptual underpinnings. One stance, deriving from an 
organizational learning perspective, has argued that search costs can be saved (March & Simon, 
1958) and routines gradually refined (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Research stemming from a 
behavioral learning perspective has suggested that a positive application of experience requires 
a situational fit between the initial and subsequent acquisitions (Ellis, Reus & Lamont, 2009; 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). A third stream, relating to a deliberate learning perspective 
(Zollo & Singh, 2004) has argued that the codification of prior experiences helps firms to 
overcome superstitious learning and to detect cause-effect relationships (Zollo, 2009). 
More recently, scholars within the strategic management tradition have concentrated on the 
implications of constellations of acquisitions (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). The predominance of 
any particular type of strategic transaction underscores the need for firms to adapt their 
capabilities in order to execute those transactions repeatedly. Specifically, a programmatic 
perspective on M&As reveals the need for firms to develop acquisition and integration 
capabilities suitable for producing benefits from series of acquisitions (Trichterborn, zu 




examining more closely how acquiring firms integrate frequent acquisitions and how their 
integration approaches evolve according to changing internal and external conditions. Among 
these conditions from an internal perspective, we concentrate on how organizational identity 
issues reciprocally shape and interconnect with acquisition and post-acquisition integration 
processes. By doing so, we dig deeper into how acquisition programs unfold, and we set the 
stage for a potentially increased understanding of the performance of programmatic acquirers. 
2.3 Acquisitions as Organizational Identity Change Trigger Events 
As organizational identity is key to understanding strategic change (Ravasi & Phillips, 2011), 
decision making (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Riantoputra, 2010), and organizational practices 
(Clark & Geppert, 2011), acquisitions have been increasingly recognized as trigger events for 
identity change at both the individual and organizational level of analysis (Giessner, Horton & 
Humborstad, 2016; Lupina-Wegener, Schneider & van Dick, 2015). Identity issues in 
acquisitions have received substantial attention, with scholars mainly focusing on individual 
identification following an acquisition (Spoor & Chu, 2017; Sung et al., 2017; Ullrich et al., 
2005; van Dick et al., 2006; van Knippenberg et al., 2006), occupational identification (Kroon 
& Noorderhaven, 2018), or leaders’ identity work (Xing & Liu, 2016).  
We concentrate on the firm level, at which organizational identity issues are expected to affect 
both the acquisition and integration processes. For instance, an envisioned organizational 
identity may influence the identification of target firms consistent with this vision. During the 
post-acquisition integration process, both the acquiring and the target organizational identities 
likely affect how the entire integration unfolds. Questions of “who are we as an organization?” 
or “what is central and distinctive to our organization?” become salient for the merging firms. 
Despite the centrality of organizational identity in strategic change (Ravasi & Phillips, 2011), 




A notable exception is the study conducted by Clark, Gioia, Ketchen and Thomas (2010), 
addressing these issues by means of a longitudinal, real time acquisition investigation 
illuminating the sensemaking and sensegiving processes of the merging parties. Their findings 
suggest the emergence of a transitional organizational identity and the impact of specific factors 
either enabling or constraining the building of a new organizational identity. This approach 
reemphasizes the social and political factors shaping the often hidden sensemaking and 
sensegiving processes that determine how firms merge (Clark & Geppert, 2011; Vaara, 2003). 
In addition, the acquisition context has been perceived as a set of boundary conditions for 
studying organizational identity change—but, again, the unit of analysis has been a single deal 
and not an entire acquisitions program. 
As acquisitions become increasingly programmatic, with multiple acquisitions pursued at a rapid 
rate, our study fulfills the need to investigate how organizational identity is constructed and 
reconstructed throughout these events. We focus on how a firm builds its global organizational 
identity through acquisitions fitting its vision of becoming an international industry and 
innovation leader. Our interpretive approach derives from the functionalist paradigm (He & 
Brown, 2013) of organizational identity research. He and Brown (2013) examined functionalist, 
social constructionist, psychodynamic, and postmodern approaches to organizational identity. In 
brief, the functionalist perspective maintains that organizational identity consists of essential, 
objective, and often tangible characteristics (for instance, corporate logos and official histories 
as part of marketing and brand management); the social constructionist perspective encompasses 
interpretive or social cognition approaches, including socially structured and shared 
understandings of organizational identity; the psychodynamic perspective surfaces the often 
unacknowledged and unconscious processes contributing to organizational identity formation; 




differences within an organizational identity. We position ourselves within the functionalist 
paradigm, particularly around the adoption of a unified global brand as a key phase within the 
evolution of a unified organizational identity. Likewise, we rely on tangible corporate histories, 
documentation, and the geographical locations of offices worldwide as integral components of 
the organizational presence and identity. 
We further rely on the social identity theory of identity building through differentiation (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986) at the organizational levels of acquirer-target comparisons. In an extension of 
classic social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), each side, acquirer and target, derives 
fundamental aspects of organizational identity through comparison and differentiation with the 
other side, complicating any quest for organizational identity integration until or unless alternate 
comparators—for instance, competitors within the strategic niche—are found. In a series of 
acquisitions responding to complex environmental demands, an acquirer inculcates various 
aspects of multiple target organizational identities into its own (e.g., van Dick et al., 2006). This 
inculcation alters organizational identity aspects of both sides—acquirer and (multiple) targets—
depending on integration approaches and on the recognition that the target organizational 
identities have already fundamentally changed because target firms typically cease to exist as 
distinct legal entities upon merger consummation. The comparison then becomes more 
proximately between the acquiring firm and the target subsidiary/division or whatever remains 
of the target firm. We consequently invoke an evolutionary and emergent developmental 
perspective (Clegg, Rhodes & Kornberger, 2007; Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton & Corley, 2013; 
Whetten, 2006) in which acquisitions are both antecedents and consequences of organizational 
identity morphing (Riantoputra, 2010; Scott & Lane, 2000). The individual acquisitions within 
an acquisitions program are elements in the feedback loop of acquisition origination, acquisition 




3. Research Method 
We conducted an exploratory single case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt et al., 2016; Yin, 
2009) examining how our focal firm reshaped its identity through an intensive acquisitions 
program and associated strategic decisions and integration approaches. The usefulness of single 
case studies has been long debated in the management domain; proponents of case study research 
have highlighted its fittingness for generating and extending theory by facilitating new insights 
(Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki, 2008; Siggelkow, 2007). In addition, case studies typically involve 
close interaction with practitioners and daily management situations, thus constituting a 
methodology well suited to creating managerially relevant knowledge (Gibbert et al., 2008). 
These features help offset the limitations inherent in the single case approach. 
Our study takes a processual developmental perspective focusing on a sequence of events—in 
our case, the acquisition series—and analyzing changes over time (Van de Ven, 1992, 2007). A 
closer approach to constructs and an increased comprehension of relationships are among the 
advantages of rich longitudinal research exploring complex phenomena (Siggelkow, 2007: 22), 
such as the evolutionary processes and transformational dynamics within an international 
acquisitions program. We furthermore adopt an interpretive research approach, explicating 
events in a first-order analysis in the voice of those actually experiencing them (Van Maanen, 
1979). In this manner, the insider points of view become the foundation of the analysis (Van 
Maanen, 1988). We then move to a second-order analysis grounded in organizational literature 
and the field research (Corbin & Strauss, 1990) to develop our conceptual contribution.  
3.1 The Research Setting 
The case study draws on a global logistics firm, pseudonymously termed Large Logistics Group 
(LLG), based in the Arabian Gulf [1]. Following privatization in 1997, LLG became an 




sea transportation and warehousing of corporate goods. LLG has publicly and frequently 
identified itself as an emerging markets firm with an economic heritage and strategic interest in 
other emerging markets. In the time span of the empirical analysis (1997-2016), LLG enacted 
over 150 mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances toward becoming a leading player and a 
technology and business process innovator in the worldwide logistics industry. The company 
expanded into over 100 nations, in emerging market regions in Northern and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Eastern Europe, China, Southeast Asia, and Central and South America, and also 
established strongholds in more developed countries in Europe, Asia and North America.  
3.2 Data Collection Techniques 
We draw on an array of primary and secondary data sources from field research conducted 
between 2012 and 2017 and meeting the Lincoln and Guba (1985) criteria for trustworthiness 
(Table 1). The use of multiple sources enabled (1) building an understanding of the historical, 
organizational, and strategic context within which the observed processes (acquisitions program, 
acquisition integration approaches, and LLG organizational identity transformation) unfolded; 
(2) capturing how top management handled the acquisition, integration, and organizational 
identity issues; and (3) triangulating primary and secondary data. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The primary data consist of a combination of interviews, informal conversations, and participant 
and non-participant observations made during company visits. Forty-two formal interviews were 
conducted with 12 members of the LLG top management team over a five-year period (Table 
2). A theoretical sampling strategy was employed to select informants based on their 
communicative competency or access to information (Warren, 2001). The theoretical sampling 
was enacted through a snowball sampling process: initial respondents, identified according to 




2017). Overall, 12 senior management members—including the CEO, chairman, vice chairman, 
and various members of the board and of penultimate management levels—were interviewed 
repeatedly until theoretical saturation was achieved (Bowen, 2008).  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The interviews were all conducted in English—the official corporate language and also the 
managerial vernacular in the company—and ranged between 60 and 90 minutes in length. These 
initial interviews were semi-structured, and the informants were asked to describe the vision and 
tactics driving the LLG strategic expansion and internationalization, as well as the lessons 
learned. At the time of the interviews, deals were in various phases of completion. Therefore, 
the interviews addressed topics that were partly retrospective and partly unfolding at the time. 
Issues of retrospective bias (Golden, 1992) and ex post rationalization (Isabella, 1990) were 
addressed through triangulation from multiple interview and observational interactions and 
corporate and business press documentary sources. As themes were coded from the data (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006; Rapley, 2001), the interviews became intensive (Weiss, 1994), examining key 
themes in greater depth, uncovering issues of interest across informants, and detecting 
interrelationships among constructs. The first author also participated in three management team 
meetings on industry-university cooperation. In these meetings, issues related to strategic 
growth, corporate social obligations, and executive education arose. Field notes taken within 24 
hours of interviews, meetings, and company visits served as a basis for the construction of 
research memos, which provided the basis for coding. Follow-up informal conversations held 
with individual managers augmented these memos and observations.  
We also amassed unobtrusive data related to the acquisitions program (Webb & Weick, 1979). 
Archival sources included company annual reports (from 1999 to 2016), strategy statements, 




as secondary data sources (Jick, 1979), heightening our comprehension of the context and 
storyline of the acquisitions program. These archival documents also served as reference points 
facilitating discussions with informants about themes emerging from the data. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Process data involve dealing with sequences of events as conceptual cornerstones and, moreover, 
can invoke multiple levels and units of analysis with unclear demarcations (Langley, 1999). In 
addition, process data can vary widely in “precision, duration, and relevance” (Langley, 1999:  
692). These observations capture the challenges of our analysis. The discrete acquisitions 
comprising the sequence of events were serial yet intersecting, as deals could overlap in 
negotiation, implementation and maintenance throughout the acquisitions program, as the timing 
and success of various aspects varied from deal to deal. 
Our analysis combines several stratagems adopted from Langley (1999), in particular, the 
temporal bracketing, synthetic, and grounded theory approaches. The temporal bracketing and 
synthetic strategies supported our initial view of the acquisitions program as a whole and, 
subsequently, our identification of major phases within the 20 years of LLG’s international 
expansion. The grounded theory strategy dovetailed with our exploration and interpretation of 
the categories emerging from the data. In line with these analytic strategies, we first drew on our 
data to reconstruct the history of the organization from privatization in 1997 to the present. The 
interviews brought up deals germane to the articulated strategic internationalization and 
expansion mandate aimed at the acquisition of historic, international logistic brands. Our list of 
focal deals was therefore drawn preliminarily from the interviews and then corroborated by a 
query of the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database to identify all international transactions 
in which LLG was the acquiring firm on the relevant date, country, and value descriptors. We 




differentiated phases of organizational identity building throughout the acquisitions program. 
The delineated phases vary in duration based on the retrospective or contemporaneous 
descriptions from the informants, corroborated by business news secondary sources (see 
Appendix A for exemplar international brand acquisitions in each phase). 
Following the open coding of our data, conducted to uncover the common threads representing 
an initial set of categories (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Rapley, 2001), we gradually collapsed these 
categories into first-order codes (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The first-order codes unveiled key 
elements of the informants’ meaning systems, drawn from in-vivo phrases used directly by the 
informants. To uncover even deeper patterns and relationships in the data, we structured second-
order categorizations by iteratively adducing concepts interlinking the first-order categorizations 
at a higher level of abstraction. From the second-order codes, we then identified the dominant 
themes constituting the dimensions of our interpretive framework. In the sequencing from first- 
to second-order codes to aggregate dimensions, we relied on constant comparison and 
convergence techniques. That is, we repeatedly contrasted data over time and across informants 
to distinguish and aggregate more abstract concepts of interest.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The first-order codes were therefore collapsed into 10 second-order concepts (Figure 1) and then 
into the four pillars of our conceptual framework. We now turn to an interpretive analysis with 
theoretical reflections and selected quotations supporting our emergent model (Figure 2).  
The coding structure was developed by the lead author, who was directly in the field, and then 
discussed by all members of the authorship team.  
4. Findings 
Throughout the focal two decades of international expansion, LLG manifested four phases of 




expansion as initially concentrating on acquisitions and later intermixing organic and 
investment-related entrepreneurial growth, as markets matured and strategies were refined 
(McKelvie & Wiklund, 2010). The four phases reflect the strategic behavior of LLG as 
advancing its internationalization by: (1) acquiring to grow rapidly: selectively absorbing 
required capabilities and retaining multiple target names from multiple acquisitions; (2) 
streamlining and acquiring: enhancing competitiveness by integrating target entities as part of a 
new global brand name, while simultaneously continuing with acquisitions; (3) engaging in 
organizational identity-consistent investments: transferring the global consistent organizational 
identity to the newly acquired firms, with flexibility in the specific integration modalities; and 
(4) acquiring for future viability: making entrepreneurial acquisitions and investments for future 
viability with a broader repertoire of integration approaches. Likewise, aspects of the 
organizational identity—technological, global, emerging market-oriented, multicultural and yet 
heritage-based—were iteratively refined. The internationalization mandate persisted throughout, 
accompanied by an enhanced emphasis on internal leadership development and on a unifying 
organizational identity. In analyzing the four phases, we determine the metamorphosis emergent 
from the acquisitions program of an Arabian Gulf EMNC, reinforcing evolutionary perspectives 
of the post-acquisition integration and multifaceted organizational identity underlying the 
overarching transformation.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
4.1 Acquiring to Grow Rapidly: Organizational Identity Diffusion, 1997-2005 
During this phase of acquiring to rapidly expand and internationalize, LLG loosely integrated 
some of the acquired entities—granting them considerable autonomy—while selectively 
absorbing only the required capabilities of other targets, depending on their financial health. 
During this phase, LLG expanded from local to regional to global, acquiring organizations and 




in the global logistics market increased marketplace rivalries (Foster & Armstrong, 2003), and 
the increased competitiveness further propelled the LLG expansionist impulse toward acquiring 
widely. In this phase, LLG also retained multiple brand names from multiple acquisitions. As 
this non-organic growth happened very quickly, the firm did not have a consistent vision geared 
toward systematically integrate the acquired entities; rather, LLG acted sometimes as an arms-
length investor, sometimes as a resource harvester—selectively retaining non-personnel assets 
and capabilities—and sometimes as an aspirant, trying to retain and emulate target characteristics 
such as being an international firm with a longer pedigree. As a newly privatized and expanding 
Arabian Gulf logistics firm, the organizational identity was thus rather haphazardly diffusing 
into each acquired firm while deliberately limiting itself. In essence, the integration strategies 
adopted during this phase were either deliberately loose—retaining legacy brand names, office 
locations, and experienced staff—or opportunistically highly selective—for instance, absorbing 
key technological or reputational assets. 
This phase, which witnessed the building of a global footprint from relative obscurity, was 
referred to by the chair as “putting together the pieces of a puzzle” and by the CEO as “a chain 
of pearls.” As observed by the chair (the present chair and CEO having both been with the 
company since phase one): 
“We discovered that integrating the acquisitions was like putting together the pieces of 
a puzzle, made more difficult because we were acquiring companies larger than us, 
operating in different regions of the world than us, and we were not yet a fully formed 
company ourselves [for the acquired firms] to integrate into. We made our share of 
mistakes and learned our lessons. There were cultural issues, even around things that 
seemed as simple as language—because we all spoke English—and sending emails. We 
would send off emails and no one would respond. We were the parent company but we 
were not necessarily regarded as such by our acquired units.” [LLG chair and former 
VP of investor relations] 
Yet, the CEO also observed: “In the beginning, it wasn’t very clear how we would go from a 




with dispersed leadership presence and capabilities.” The “puzzle” and “pearls” metaphors 
imply a sense of direction, but the CEO further commented: “Just because we were clear-sighted 
did not mean it [our development] was going to happen in a certain way.” As noted by the same 
CEO, who became the organizational leader immediately after the privatization: 
“We wanted to grow from our own skill and not just be in a position where we were 
waiting to see if the government would give us something, would give us a concession. If 
you can get those assets, it’s great, and we tried to get them, but it’s not something you 
can replicate in other parts of the world—it is a local, not a global strategy. We did some 
strategizing and figured out that we wanted to focus on services and build a network in 
the emerging markets and also in developed economies. Part of the strategy to develop 
our network—now in over 100 countries—was to leverage acquisitions to build a 
platform for expanding from our founding location to all the places in the world where 
we are today.” (CEO) 
As observed in the example of sending emails and not receiving responses, the inter/intra-
organizational relationships were complex and initially more conflictive than cooperative (Ring 
& Van de Ven, 1994). Conflict also developed around managerial retention, as could happen 
when, in the words of the CEO, “You buy a company with a management team and tell them we 
will be using you, but then you buy a bigger platform [in the same region] and you have to tell 
the first management team that you won’t be needing them.” The organizational identity 
diffusion can be viewed as a transitional state stemming from resource attractions. Organizations 
attract additional resources due both to the compatibility with existing resources and capabilities 
(strategic investments) and to the reputational or aspirational images conveyed (strategic 
projections) (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). Idiosyncratic resources of both the acquirer and the 
target—such as access to new markets and cheap production facilities—impact the acquisition 
dynamics (Buckley, Elia & Kafouros, 2010). For LLG, the internationalization imperative was 
a strategic projection served by both their original slack resources, such as real estate, and by 




4.2 Streamlining and Acquiring: Organizational Identity Consolidation, 2006-2007 
In the second phase, internal conditions had changed throughout the burgeoning expansion. The 
firm now had more international clients and customers from both developed and developing 
markets. At the same time, external pressures due to competition had increased in both sets of 
markets. In the wake of the rapid expansion and loose integration of the first phase, the low 
degree of coordination among the acquired entities and the customer confusion created by a 
proliferation of brand names had complicated the responsiveness to these competitive 
pressures—for instance, from Asian logistics firms accessing world markets (Foster & 
Armstrong, 2003). The LLG leadership engaged in a corporate-level reassessment, focusing 
upon and fine-tuning toward a more unified organizational identity, and streamlining and 
formalizing based upon the global footprint already established through phase one. As noted by 
the VP of corporate development, who had joined the firm toward the end of the first phase: 
“By 2005, our first three big acquisitions had all kept their own names and we discovered 
that all three [units] were bidding for the same business, and people did not know we 
were all part of the same company. We had become known for having lots of cash for 
making acquisitions, but we did not yet have a separate recognizable identity. We had a 
big meeting in [Singapore] with our managers from around the world to straighten it out, 
and . . . [at first] it created even more confusion. We decided we needed to do a 
rebranding, and, along with professional advisement on names, we later acquired a 
[small] company known as [LLG Distributors] in the UK, and we liked that name and 
took it on.” (VP Corporate Development and M&A) 
The brand search culminated in 2006 with the acquisition of a small logistics sector firm with 
the desired name. The conceptual moniker—in this paper pseudonymously denoted as LLG—
expressed the avowed strategic aptitudes of the firm and superseded the profusion of brand 
names. The changing environmental conditions and multitude of acquisitions had necessitated a 
reconfiguration not only of brand management activities but also of integration approaches (King 
& Schriber, 2016). LLG now had a global brand name reinforcing a unified global organizational 




international reputations. LLG could now more strategically select targets based on locations 
and resource needs. The firm also exercised more integration coordination and control. Under 
the new brand name, LLG integrated its targets more closely and with a higher expressed level 
of awareness of the differential fates of the acquired managerial and professional personnel. The 
firm’s resources, image, and organizational identity were aligned to better respond to 
competitive pressures and to prevent client and customer confusion. 
The CEO reflected on the daunting nature of the acquisitions and rebranding program: 
“Challenging, no doubt, it has definitely been challenging acquiring 50 different 
company cultures and brands and putting them all together into one brand. One of the 
reasons we did our rebranding was to bring that together, and we chose to come up with 
a brand that was [essentially] new to everybody, so that everybody had to give something 
up. We did the [official] rebranding in 2007 to reflect the global network and the unique-
for-the-industry way our company interacted with customers on a one-to-one basis. We 
chose to focus on our strengths, something unique to us, and we chose [our logo] to 
reinforce the positioning and strength of the company. We did a lot of research and a lot 
of thinking to come up with the image, colors and logo emphasizing the way we run our 
business in contrast to our competition. We chose [a symbol] which appeals as we’re 
doing big business in Asia. It reinforces the positioning and strength we are trying to 
achieve. It reinforces our core strengths and core strategy and our position in the 
emerging markets.” (CEO) 
The new identity and integration approach involved more formalization. By 2007, the new brand 
name and expanded international organizational identity—involving a new corporate color and 
logo—had been launched, symbolizing the formal global début of the firm. The post-acquisition 
integration strategies now became more oriented toward shedding target brand names, enfolding 
targets into the LLG organizational identity, centralizing selected functions through the LLG 
headquarters, retaining any key target personnel, and maintaining varying degrees of autonomy 
for the target units, depending on, for instance, innovation motives. With respect to the 
integration approach, a member of the management team observed: 
“If you acquire a company in 2005 that is technologically advanced and you continue 




improvements. But if you acquire and ‘tie their hands’, then you will impede innovation 
and lose that edge. Acquiring to gain a technological edge could work in the short term, 
but what you do with that company next would to some extent predict how the benefits 
unfold. What do you do with the founders, is a very pressing question when it comes to 
technology and innovation through M&As. The vision, spirit, and drive of the founders 
are very important.” (VP Corp Dev) 
He later noted that, although LLG was able to retain some of the target founders and leaders, this 
retention was an ongoing challenge as these individuals had originally been “incentivized by 
equity participation” that was not available to them in LLG as the acquiring firm.  
In the midst of rebranding, LLG also began evolving a tandem strategy enabling a unified global 
brand yet also explicitly allowing for some acquired firms to retain aspects of their own names 
and identities if they were not part of the core (which had originally caused the confusion in 
2005 and earlier). The totality of the acquisitions and integrations reconfigured the firm to the 
extent that, in culmination of their first decade of acquisitions (1997-2007), the top management 
formulated a dual vision of the worldwide rebranding. This dualism involved (1) operationally 
and impressionistically unifying the core interrelated logistics lines of business, and (2) 
distinguishing supporting, less-related businesses or periphery activities operating under both 
their own brand names and the overarching LLG brand. Strategic dualism applies in our analysis 
as a second order code encompassing multiple parallel pursuits and also as a construct with its 
origins in management research in specializations as disparate as supply chain management 
(Nishiguchi, 1990) and leadership (Abell, 2010; Knights & Mueller, 2004). Specifically on 
dualism, in terms of company profile, both global integrated logistics and specialty services were 
recognized as persistent lines of business of LLG; in terms of growth mode, acquisitions and 
joint ventures were both frequent strategic maneuvers for internationalization, expansion, and 
innovation enhancement; and, finally, a dualism occurred in the twin pursuits of global networks 




needed to pursue both because of its objective of maintaining a strong presence in both emerging 
and emerged markets. 
As noted by Gioia and Thomas (1996), in circumstances of strategic uncertainty and change, an 
envisioned organizational identity—not, at that point, an actual organizational identity but, 
rather, an aspirational one—drives the interpretation of and responsiveness to competitive 
pressures and business conditions. For LLG in the second phase, the envisioned organizational 
identity became that of a globally unified firm. The integration efforts supported the realization 
of this organizational identity vision in that the integration strategy became more: (1) unified, 
with the global brand name; (2) flexible, with the core-periphery distinction in the organization 
of the lines of business; and (3) cognizant of the persistent dilemma of retaining talented 
personnel crucial for sustained innovation and not fully resolved through either (1) or (2). 
4.3 Investing and Reinforcing: Organizational Identity Recovery, 2008-2009 
The rebranding and organizational identity transformation—as demonstrated by the increased 
brand recognition and stature of the firm—combined with an increasing portfolio of integration 
approaches, ranging from tighter to looser, all occurred just before the global financial crisis of 
2008-2009. Following that economic downturn, client and revenue dilemmas confidential to the 
firm occurred and were handled. While navigating through the global financial crisis, LLG did 
not pursue any pivotal acquisitions but concentrated on investing in and reinforcing its global 
organizational identity through the parallel strategic initiatives of launching now flourishing 
global social responsibility and sustainability programs and an executive talent management 
program. The CEO observed that the social responsibility and sustainability programs along with 
the partnership with the UN “really helped really tie our culture together . . . and helped to bring 
the different companies and management styles together.” We have defined the second order 




together, which can also be seen in the integration approaches adopted during the second phase 
in bringing together target businesses under the new LLG organizational identity. During this 
phase, the board also initiated a company-wide leadership development program addressing 
those who were already in middle management, occupied key roles, and had displayed top 
performance. According to the required stock market financial disclosures, fiscal conservatism 
and the sense of corporate responsibility to shareholders meant that LLG ultimately stayed debt-
free and profitable even in challenging economic times.  
As noted by one of the VP management team members: “Our business model changed after the 
early paradigm-shifting acquisitions and then it changed again after the global financial crisis." 
He elaborated, “In 2007 before the global financial crisis, we were super aggressive in our 
thinking” and had already expanded to “over 600 offices worldwide.” Then “the decision was 
made and the revelation was had that not all markets are equal.” Rather than the previous 
aggressive expansion, continuing in the words of the vice president of corporate development, 
“we focused on ourselves as an emerging markets company, and we made specific smaller 
acquisitions to fill in white spaces in our global map.” This strategy involved selected deals in 
Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. The third phase evidences strategic 
thinking aimed at reinforcing organizational identity perceptions through both internal and 
external stakeholder outreach actions. LLG was selectively acquiring and, furthermore, was 
investing in and reinforcing a global organizational identity and reputation. 
This reinforcement and even recovery of organizational identity by LLG in the third phase 
coheres with the tenets of social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Spoor & Chu, 2017), 
one of the previously mentioned conceptual underpinnings of organizational identity research. 
Social identity theory proposes that identity in relation to others fundamentally derives from 




at least in part from comparing one organization to another and taking points of difference as 
key in establishing a distinct sense of “who are we as an organization” among the organizational 
members. Social identity theory further maintains that, when inter-group boundaries and 
distinctions are not readily found, they will be identified and reified driven by a fundamental 
impulse toward disambiguation and identification. As an emerging markets firm from the Middle 
East, LLG has also determined an organizational identity as an emerging markets leader, hence 
differentiating itself from both emerging and emerged market competitors.  This strengthening 
of organizational identity through the emerging markets lens occurred in the transition from the 
global financial crisis to the post-crisis era. 
4.4 Acquiring for Future Viability: Organizational Identity Renewal/Reinvention, 2010-2017 
In this phase, LLG was acquiring for future viability with controlled multiple organizational 
identities. In a sense, this phase saw a deconstruction of the single organizational identity in 
response to a now tripartite differentiation within the scope of the business—a central logistics 
line, a specialized services and infrastructure offering, and then a deliberately open-ended, 
opportunistic “whitespace” for new technology and innovation ventures. The thrust of the 
differentiation and of a deliberately more nuanced identity was to increase the flexibility, 
projected performance, and longevity of the organization. 
After the global financial crisis—with the price of oil back up over 100USD per barrel by March 
2011, in which vicinity it stayed until September 2014—LLG started to invest in start-up firms 
and to fund internal entrepreneurial ventures. In the case of the partial acquisitions into start-up 
firms, LLG remained an arms-length acquirer to encourage innovation. However, in the case of 
the larger or full acquisitions, continuing the same practice as after the organizational rebranding, 
LLG typically acted not as a partner but as an acquirer. Their corporate brand identity was in 




organizational identity unification to legitimate a dominating integration approach. These 
organizational identity claims can be expressed through verbal and written corporate 
communications concretizing assertions of, for instance, global industry excellence and 
preeminence in global social responsibility (Czarniawska, 1997). As noted by a key informant 
and manager in the firm: 
“[LLG] is in many countries and has lots of wholly owned subsidiaries and a complex 
corporate governance structure—which is a very complicated environment in which to 
nurture that innovation mindset and culture—which is why we and other companies now 
tend to set up and nurture companies on the edges . . . We make a start-up with our 
resources but with a completely separate identity and management and we keep it 
completely separate and without bridges to our main company. We also invest in start-
ups elsewhere, outside our own company and in other parts of the world.” (VP for 
corporate development) 
The same top management informant further noted: 
“We are always, always innovating and looking for ways to monetize the innovation, 
because innovation is much more important than acquiring and sitting on technologies. 
Innovation comes in the form of the skillsets and capabilities of individuals. It is not just 
enough to buy a company or a technology; you have to also buy the culture and the 
capabilities for innovation. Innovation then builds on innovation.” (VP of corporate 
development) 
Yet, at the same time, LLG further emphasized its now-maturing organizational identity as a 
logistics leader, an emerging markets leader, an internationally strategically adept firm, and, 
increasingly, a firm divesting hard assets—in accordance with the new asset-light platform 
business models—and pursuing innovation opportunities. Again, we can see the relevance of 
previous research on organizational responses to changing environmental conditions and 
constituent expectations (Czarniawska, 1997; Ravasi & Phillips, 2011; Scott & Lane, 2000). In 
the case of LLG, as observed by the CEO, “we have no debt” and “we have been successful—we 
have consistently made money for our shareholders.” These expectations of performance and 
profitability continue to be met through engagements in emerging markets and with technology 




5. Discussion and Conclusions 
In our paper, we have investigated how an emerging markets firm from the Middle East 
internationalizes, expands, and adapts to internal and external changes through differentiated 
acquisitions within an acquisitions program. Specifically, we have examined how, following a 
rapid internationalization, changes in an acquisitions program, integration approaches, and 
organizational identity are interrelated. By examining two decades of expansion by an EMNC 
from the high-income emerging markets of the Arabian Gulf—a geographically and 
economically crucial region previously relatively neglected in the strategic management 
literature—we take a dynamic perspective on organizational identity metamorphosis. In line with 
Achtenhagen and colleagues (2017), we find that the types of acquisitions and of post-acquisition 
integration approaches changed over time, and we further find these changes cumulatively 
transforming the organizational identity of the firm. We identified four phases in the 
organizational identity transformation: diffusion, consolidation, recovery, and 
renewal/reinvention. Throughout these phases, the changes in organizational identity, 
acquisitions program, and integration approaches are closely interconnected.  
In the first phase, the LLG acquisitions program began with rather loosely coupled acquisitions 
projects. Although tightly coupled and interdependent acquisition projects typically characterize 
an acquisitions program (Chatterjee, 2009), we did not find deliberate clarity and interconnection 
among the first acquisitions. Rather, this clarity emerged serendipitously as the top managers of 
the firm commenced using metaphors such as “pieces of a puzzle” or “chain of pearls” after 
several acquisitions. Slack resources in part triggered the ambition to expand worldwide and to 
build an innovative logistics ecosystem for managing and delivering freight forwarding, 
warehousing, and related services. The LLG innovations in strategic technology and services 




expansion and financial success. While Laamanen and Keil (2008), for instance, find that 
acquisition rate and variability had a negative effect on performance due to time compression 
diseconomies and inabilities to learn, we find that granting autonomy to targets or acting as an 
arms-length investor enhanced both acquisition rates and variability. Autonomous integration 
approaches avoided the over-commitment of managerial resources to integration tasks, reduced 
the time available to competitors to respond to the acquisitions, minimized disruption in the 
target entities, and increased the acquisition rate and, later, variability. In the early acquisitions, 
LLG had not yet accumulated experience and did not appear to draw causal inferences, as the 
clarity of the acquisitions program and differentiated approaches developed over time. Despite 
the advantages of the internationalization speed and initial light-touch (Liu & Woywode, 2013) 
or loose integration approach, in this first phase, LLG underwent identity diffusion and 
coordination difficulties owing to sometimes complex and conflictive relations (Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1994) with the acquired entities.  
External and internal developments prompted LLG to change the style of acquisitions and 
integration that had dominated the first phase. Although distant integration permitted LLG to 
acquire quickly, the repeated use of this integration approach reduced organizational 
competitiveness due to resource redundancy. The multiple brands resulting from loosely 
integrated targets led to coordination problems, in-house competition with units bidding against 
each other, and customer confusion. Motivated by both market-side and within-firm pressures, 
LLG recognized: first, the need to change the acquisitions program and the corresponding 
integration approaches to streamline organizational systems and reduce complexity; second, the 
need to reconfigure the capabilities and activities residing in the previously more balkanized 
“puzzles” and “pearls” now being brought together; and, third, the need to further unify their 




organizational identity—combined with integration, coordination, and streamlining efforts—
increased LLG’s responsiveness to the competitive pressures and business conditions 
experienced throughout the phases (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). These changes brought benefits 
particularly during the global economic downturn, as LLG remained profitable and debt-free in 
the second phase even during that time.  
In the third phase, LLG—now an established global organization in a commoditizing as well as 
competitive industry—adopted internal measures such as social responsibility, further 
technology investments, and leadership development programs. These measures reinforced 
intra-organizational commonalities and complementarities, further strengthening the firm. These 
steps also affected the acquisitions program and integration approaches. After assembling the 
puzzles and pearls of the first phase, LLG filled the remaining resource gaps with strategically 
focused acquisitions and an integration approach that increasingly involved identity transfer to 
the target.  
Again, environmental and organizational considerations precipitated change in LLG’s 
acquisitions program and integration approaches moving into the fourth phase. Externally, 
recovery from the global economic crisis began. Internally, LLG recognized that large 
centralized organizations, on the one hand, are easier to coordinate and are potentially stronger 
and more stable; on the other hand, they can become inflexible, risk averse, and overly focused 
on operational cash flows, reducing long-term vision, investments, identification of business 
opportunities, and, thus, future viability. LLG therefore started acquiring future options in start-
up firms and seeding internal organic entrepreneurial ventures. As the LLG organizational 
identity had, by now, successfully permeated the maturing global organization, start-ups and 
internal entrepreneurial ventures could not coexist under the same identity as the core businesses. 




business-level organizational identities that were only loosely integrated to avoid disruption 
(Giessner et al., 2016; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam, Singh & Chaudhuri, 2009) and to 
maintain future innovative business opportunities. In brief, the acquisition capabilities portfolio 
accumulated across the four phases enabled LLG to hasten the recognition and application of 
unifying the appropriate integration approaches, reinforcing the organizational financial success 
and the organizational identity transformation. 
5.1 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
The main limitation of the present study is that it is based on a single case study. The contribution 
of inductive studies is still debated by management scholars (Eisenhardt et al., 2016). Our choice 
of an inductive case study was motivated by the lack of previous studies combined with our 
interest in illuminating organizational identity-building processes in an acquisitions program 
(Langley, 1999). While multiple cases could have been desirable, established research protocols 
for the rigor and relevance of single case study research as well as the practicalities of negotiating 
access in a relatively closed and highly relationship-driven business environment recommended 
that we pursue an in-depth investigation of a single firm, which then led to our discovery, within 
that firm, of an acquisitions program involving a number of events sufficient to uncover the 
acquisition program-styles-integration relationships leading into the organizational identity 
metamorphosis. In consequence, we aimed to be both persuasive and convincing in the analysis 
of the data and in the interpretation of results (Siggelkow, 2007). In our view, the lack of 
generalizability is counterbalanced by the richness of the story. Generalizability could be 
augmented by future studies extending our insights by generating and testing hypotheses on a 
large sample of acquisitions. 
An additional limitation relates to a relative lack of the target perspective. Acquisitions are 




by the acquiring top management team. Previous studies have illuminated how this process may 
unfold in a single acquisition (Clark et al., 2010). In our case, the intensity of acquisitions and 
related transactions (more than 150 deals in 20 years) and the variations in international coverage 
and required acquiring firm disclosures hindered the systematic gathering of data about target 
firms. Therefore, we provide the LLG perspective on multiple targets and acknowledge the 
incompleteness of the individual post-acquisition processes portrait. We recommend that future 
studies remedy this flaw by adding the target perspective to the examination of the relationship 
between the integration choices and the identity dynamics between the merging firms. A way to 
address this limitation in the case of a frequent acquirer could be to treat the acquisition deals as 
single cases and pursue a cross-case comparison. Another limitation resides in the research 
duration (2012-2016), which represents only part of the historical and ongoing acquisitions 
program. As noted in the methods, the high proportion of managers who had been with the 
company since 1997 allays this limitation—as the managers themselves embodied the history 
not directly experienced in the field research duration—but retrospective bias still pertains and 
was mitigated through secondary sources. 
We also envision several avenues for future investigation. First, we recommend that future 
scholars study how organizational identity and individual identification might jointly influence 
the post-acquisition process. While individual identification has been often studied and 
organizational identity has gained increasing importance among acquisition scholars, the 
intersection still lacks attention. In this regard, we encourage scholars to adopt a multilevel 
approach. Second, our study also showed how a programmatic acquirer metamorphoses over 
time and how this metamorphosis also changes the integration approaches. This insight 
elucidates the challenges inherent in learning from complex and rare events. Thus, we 




through acquisition programs, leading to the development of tacit and explicit/codified 
knowledge about the management of post-acquisition processes. Third, further issues could be 
addressed by examining the transformation of emerging market firms into global “emerged” 
players; Specifically, we recommend a study of when and how these transitions occur in practice 
and perception (as opposite to conventional classifications) and in what respects large global 
EMNCs begin to act more like MNCs from developed regions.  
5.2 Managerial Implications 
Our study offers also several managerial contributions. First, although many companies execute 
acquisitions on a regular basis in pursuing strategic goals and adapting to changing environments 
(Schipper & Thompson, 1983; Zheng et al., 2010), M&As are considered rare strategic events 
(Zollo, 2009). Our research shows that acquisition strategies change over time to meet complex 
environmental and organizational demands to maintain competitive advantage. Consequently, 
what drives the success of one acquisition is not necessarily the opposite of what causes the 
failure of another one. Managers cannot simply rely on past experiences to extrapolate future 
actions; rather, they must constantly reflect on internal and external circumstances to determine 
essential present tactics and future maneuvers.  
Second, the implementation of acquisition programs invokes the complexities in the 
interrelationship between acquisition integration and organizational identity issues. 
Traditionally, managers (usually those of the acquiring firm) decide the extent to which the target 
firm should be integrated or granted autonomy. While integration imposes changes on the 
organizational identities of both the acquiring and target entities (van Dick et al., 2006), granting 
autonomy to a target indicates parallel organizational identities. Despite the benefits of 
autonomy—such as minimizing conflicts (Angwin, 2004; Gomes, Angwin, Weber & Tarba, 




drawbacks such as increased coordination or decreased organizational performance can arise. 
For instance, multiple organizational identities may hamper the rollout of strategic initiatives 
(Ravasi & Phillips, 2011) suited to meeting changing environmental demands. Thus, managers 
need to be aware of the trade-off between different integration approaches and that what may 
work in one acquisition or acquisitions program may not be transferable to another one.  
Third, the execution of an acquisition is intrinsically complex and that of an acquisition program 
triggers even further complexity. As acquisition processes have many “instabilities, ambiguities, 
politicization, and fragmentation” (Meglio & Risberg, 2010: 90), they are far from the ideal types 
commonly comprehensible through linear relationships. Managerial awareness of the intricacies 
of organizational identity and of the temporal and integration dynamics of acquisition programs 
is therefore essential to the identification of suitable solutions.  
Fourth, each acquisition in a program should contribute to the strategic goals of the firm. Thus, 
managers should treat each individual acquisition not as a separate and distinct event but, rather, 
as a link in a chain aimed at implementing the acquisitions program and the corporate objectives. 
Again, managers must be aware of the trade-off that what contributes to the success of an 
individual acquisition does not necessarily contribute to the strategic goals of the firm. Finally, 
we hope that our research will stimulate others to investigate the fascinating interplay among 
organizational identity, acquisition programs, and integration approaches.  
Notes 
[1] The geographical context under investigation is referred to as the Arabian Gulf or Arabian 
Peninsula. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comprises the six economically and culturally 
interconnected countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE 
(Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 2015). Most of the GCC countries have a 
natural resource specialization in oil and gas, with Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia as the leaders 
in these natural resources and UAE as the exemplar of economic diversification. The region has 
a mixed profile. For example, its income, literacy, education, health care, and technological 




access to global travel for business, educational, or entertainment purposes, the citizens of the 
GCC countries have attainments and privileges resembling or exceeding those of G-20 citizens. 
Yet, for example, infant mortality and disease rates, income polarization and inequalities, voting, 
civil and gender rights, and the unevenness of the housing stock, fresh water, and electricity 
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Growth by unifying identity: 






Global citizenship and social 
responsibility:  
Cultural unification 
Retaining managers and 
developing leaders 
Performance technology and 
innovation 




Second-Order Concepts  First-Order Codes Figure 1: Data Structure 
Strategic investments: consistency across present resources and activities 
Strategic projections: images the organization communicates about itself 
Speed of growth: liquidity and access to capital markets 
Global, Technological, Innovative, Emerging Markets, Multicultural,  
Heritage-Inspired, Socially Responsible 
Global growth trajectory 
Speed of expansion and performance enhancement 
Global brand development and promulgation 
Managers’ beliefs about global vision and mission and value proposition 
Local versus global strategies 
Identity-consistent strategies: innovation and emerging markets strategies 
 
Cultural consistency in integration, Autonomy and innovation in integration, 
Management and founder departures and retention 
Partnership with other firms and United Nations 
Connectedness across locations and lines of business 
Team members and social responsibility 
 
EM identity-consistent strategic projections, fine-tuning and reassessment 
Relationship with the global rebranding 
Relationship with the social responsibility people-planet-and-profits 
Technology identity and innovation orientation 
Focused and identity-consistent strategic investments 
 
Dualities: Global integrated logistics and specialized services/ infrastructure; 
Global networks and focused optimization; Acquisitions plus joint ventures and 
multiple growth modalities 
Leadership development/ cultural integration yet recognition of differentiation 




Figure 1: Data Structure [preceding page] and  





Table 1: Data Overview 
 
Sources of data 
Primary/Secondary 
Content Amount of data Time span 




 42 interviews  
 63 pages of transcribed interviews 
1997-2016 






  3 meetings attended 
12 pages of field notes from meetings 
2012-2016 




Annual reports [S] Strategy vision 
Financial figures 
CSR initiatives 
17 annual reports + 3 CSR reports 17 years 
Company presentations [S] Company growth strategy 
Company business model 
7 presentations 2012-2016 
Newsletters [S] Facts and figures about the 
company growth strategy 




Table 2: Informant Profiles 
 
Informant position # Interviews Tenure (years) in the position/[in the organization] 
CEO 5 20/[20] 
Chairman 10 2/[15] 
Director of Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
5 2/[15] 
CEO Business Unit 1 10/[15] 
CFO 1 8/[8] 
CMO 1 7/[8] 
Special Advisor to the CEO 2 15/[15] 
CSR Specialist 3 7/[7] 
HR Specialist 1 2 6/[8] 
HR Specialist 2 2 4/[4] 
Corporate Administrator 1 5 5/[5] 





Table 3: Representative supporting data for second-order concepts and first-order codes 
Second-order concepts First-order categories Representative first-order interview data 
 
    I. Organizational Identity Diffusion: Expansion and Internationalization, 1997-
2005—Acquiring to Grow Rapidly 
Growth by allowing for multiple identities Strategic investments: consistency across 
present resources and activities  
"We discovered that integrating the acquisitions was like putting together the pieces of a puzzle, made 
more difficult because we were acquiring companies larger than us, operating in different regions of the 
world than us, and we were not yet a fully formed company ourselves [for the acquired firms] to integrate 
into." [Chair] 
 Strategic projections: images the organization 
communicates about itself 
"We started looking at acquisitions in 2000 several years after privatization, and we had to do in phases, 
first developing the real estate side of the company; but we needed a strategy in place. We decided to focus 
on services for emerging markets and also developed economies, and to get into that many countries, we 
knew we needed to leverage acquisitions to achieve this." (CEO) 
Multifaceted organizational identity Global “In terms of value, I do believe that we created a lot of value by putting together networks spanning the 
globe, and we did it in fairly short order [within about a five-year period]. If someone were trying to do 
that today, it would cost literally billions and billions of dollars.” (CEO) 
 Technological "We’re a little bit like a logistics company with heavy IT and also a logistics company with a strong 
investment component. It works well for us as a company going into emerging markets without much 
infrastructure, where that infrastructure has to be in some way accessed or established. We are like a 
technology company, with logistics added in, and we also invest in infrastructure, which makes it difficult 
to compare us to other logistics companies, and we like that." (CEO) 
 Multicultural "The Gulf War played a major role in motivating people who went and studied abroad for one or more 
years, subsidized by the government, and then peoples' ideas of what is normal changed. We had not had 
thriving international industries going into the 20th century, except possibly pearl diving, then suddenly 
there was all this oil and all this wealth. At time of the Invasion, many people left to go to school in 
Switzerland and the US, and then they came back and saw things differently and did things differently. 
There were different attitudes, perspectives and behaviors that people had from their time away . . .There 
were many changes, among those who had spent the time away and were then coming back." (Chair) 
Changing acquisitions/ strategies Managers' beliefs about acquisitions In the beginning it wasn’t very clear how we would go from being a company with a management structure 
in [the Arabian Gulf] to a company that would have global businesses with dispersed leadership presence 
and capabilities (CEO) 
 Vision and mission "After doing [our first large international acquisition], we had to think about what exactly is our value 








 Competitive advantage We can work strongly with customers to customize for their needs which [our competitors] cannot as easily 
do. . . We put customers at the center of our value proposition. (CEO) 
 Local versus global strategies We wanted to grow from our own skill and not just be in a position where we were waiting to see if the 
government would give us something, would give us a concession. If you can get those assets, it’s great, 
and we tried to get them, but it’s not something you can replicate in other parts of the world—it is a local, 
not a global strategy. We did some strategizing and figured out that we wanted to focus on services and 
build a network in the emerging markets and also in developed economies. Part of the strategy to develop 
that network—now in over 100 countries—was to leverage acquisitions to build a platform for expanding 
from our founding location to all the places in the world where we are today. (CEO) 
    II. Organizational Identity Consolidation: Global Branding and Market 
Presence, 2006-2007—Streamlining and Acquiring 
 
Growth by unifying identity Global Identity “Going back to 2005 we were still known as [having cash] and we had bought two other [large 
international] logistics brands, and then all three companies [our original company and the two new 
acquisitions] were bidding for the same additional logistics businesses and people did not know [we were 
the same company]. We had a big meeting in [major Asian city] in 2005 to straighten it out, and we decided 
we needed to do a rebranding, and, along with much professional advisement on names, we had acquired 
a company [with a name we liked] and we that name and took it on.” (VP3) 
 Reassessment [We chose a conceptual brand] to reflect the global network and the unique-for-the-industry way our 
company interacted with customers on a one-to-one basis. (CEO) 
 Fine-Tuning We wanted to brand around [a concept] to reinforce the positioning and strength we are trying to achieve. 
It [our brand] reinforces our core strengths and core strategy and our position in the emerging markets. 
(CEO) 
 Growth trajectory With everything centralized, we went from 20-30,000USD revenues and 200-300 employees to a high 
around $8B annual revenues and 40,000 employees. (CEO) 
Changing postacquisition integration 
approaches 
Postacquisition integration: cultural 
consistency 
Even if their [target] culture is not perfectly consistent with our culture, we try to bring them along, do 
change management, to show them the way we have of doing things. . .but if it does not work out, then 
ultimately we might have to change over the management team.” (Chair) 




 Postacquisition integration: autonomy  
and innovation 
"We acquired a firm that had a specialty capability, about how to refine moves with certain kinds of 
products, about how to do certain moves with certain kinds of products, and we added value by taking that 
small business and plugging it into our global network, and the strategy worked, Their revenues grew [10x 
larger]. . .and that CEO is still with us." (CEO) 
  "If you acquire a company in 2005 that is technologically advanced and you continue culturally to nurture 
that spirit of innovation, then you will continue to gain from their improvements; but if you acquire and 
"tie their hands," then you will impede innovation and lose that edge. Acquiring companies to gain a 
technological edge could work in the short term, but what you do with that company next would to some 
extent predict how the benefits would continue to unfold." (VP3) 
 Postacquisition integration: departures and 
retention 
"The reality is that some stay and some leave, and you can sometimes get synergy from the overlap of 
those who stay." (CEO) 
  "What do you do with the founders is a very pressing question when it comes to technology and innovation 
through M&A. The vision, spirit and drive of the founders are very important."" (VP3)" 
  "You buy a company with a management team and tell them we will be using you as a platform for 
expanding into [a certain region of the world], but then you buy a bigger platform [in that region] and you 
have to tell the first management team that you won’t be needing them." (CEO) 
Global brand, image and identity Emerging markets strategy "After the rebranding, we became more focused in our acquisitions. We thought of ourselves as an 
emerging markets company, and we made some specific smaller acquisitions in Latin America—Mexico 
and Brazil. We needed to fill in the white spaces in our global map. We have since been filling in the white 
spaces and confirming ourselves as an emerging markets logistics company, expanding either organically 
or through acquisitions. Emerging markets for us could be anywhere from Brazil to Ghana to Kazakhstan." 
(VP3) 
 
 Matching risks and opportunities “In an emerging markets network, as we are, we wanted to take on the right level of risk for the right level 
of opportunity.” (Chair) 
    III. Organizational Identity Recovery/ Resilience/ Restoration: Post-Global 
Finance Crisis: Global Citizenship, Cultural Integration, and Social 
Responsibility, 2008-2009—Investing and Reinforcing 
Global citizenship and social responsibility Partnership with other firms and UN “When you’re in over 100 countries, there’s always going to be the case where you have some kind of 
natural disaster that’s going on. We have a partnership with the UN and we partner with other logistics 




Cultural unification Connectedness across locations and lines of 
business 
"[Our social responsibility and disaster relief] is good for the morale of the company, because people 
actually see and feel that they are part of a network that is active and engaged in the community. That 
helped really tie our culture together. It has really helped our culture and helped to bring the different 
companies and management styles together in a way that has been unique for how to blend, and that has 
been unusual and has also been very effective. (CEO) 
Retaining managers and developing leaders Leadership development/ cultural integration 
yet recognition of differentiation 
We have a leadership development program, which has been an integrating mechanism, to take high-
potential people from each of the businesses. At any given point we have about 20-30 people in the program 
from across the businesses, and it has been a way of bringing people together. . .[but] If you are good in 
your job and a high potential person, I want you to stay in that job. If we actually take you out of that job 
[and put you in another job or another part of the company] after leadership development, it would be bad 
for the shareholders, right? (CEO) 
 Leadership heritage, legacy and inspiration “Our leadership [CEO, top management and directors] has been key to getting the company to where it is 
today.” (Chair} 
    IV. Organizational Identity Renewal/ Reinvention: Entrepreneurial Outreach, 
Focused Acquisitions and Related Investments, 2010-2016—Acquiring for 
Future Viability 
Performance by technology and innovation Technology Identity Technology has become even more important because our customers would like us to provide them with 
more than just conventional data analysis. They want more insights into the data and how we are doing 
business with them, so that they make better decisions. Our pursuit of technology lets us satisfy customer 
needs and differentiates us from the competitors. [VP3] 
 Innovation orientation "It is not just enough to buy a company or a technology, you have also to buy the culture and the capabilities 
for innovation. [LLG] is in many countries and has lots of wholly owned subsidiaries and a complex 
corporate governance structure—which is a very complicated environment in which to nurture that 
innovation mindset and culture—which is why we and other companies now tend to set up and nurture 
companies on the edges. . . We make a start-up with our resources but with a completely separate identity 
and management and we keep it completely separate and without bridges to our main company. We also 
invest in start-ups elsewhere, outside our own company and in other parts of the world." (VP3) 
Performance by emerging markets emphasis EM identity-consistent strategic projections, 
fine-tuning and reassessment 
"[Our] story parallels the rise of emerging markets in the global economy. The company got its start as a 
local warehousing provider . . and grew to become the largest logistics company in the Middle East. [We] 
acquired more than 40 logistics brands around the world, investing billions to build a global network with 
a strong footprint in emerging markets. Today, [LLG] is one of the world’s largest integrated logistics 




Strategic dualism Global integrated logistics + specialized 
services /infrastructure 
"In the last two years, the decision was made and the revelation was had that not all markets are equal. We 
then had a line running down our thought processes dividing into two: one set concentrating on freight 
forwarding and the other set concentrating on a more full service operation. We have identified certain 
countries and offices as being purely network offices concentrating on the cargo freight forwarding and 
other markets where customers demand more specialization and a fuller suite of services. We are splitting 
the offices based on that model. Our business model changed after the early pivotal acquisitions and then 
it changed again after the global financial crisis." (VP3) 
 Global network + focused optimization "We are more crisp in how different parts of the business add value now. . . .After we established our 
network, our focus has been on optimizing—on how to improve and become more efficient and not always 
actually acquiring new companies. We’re already in 95% of the global trade-zones, and we have a 95% 
GP [global footprint]. (CEO) 
 Acquisitions + additional expansion 
modalities 
"Acquisitions are driven by enhancing or increasing capabilities, and joint ventures are another way of 
doing this, with the benefit of a partner with a proven track record. We are right now working on joint 
ventures where for developing capabilities we do not have fully in-house. By partnering with certain 
companies, we then get that capability in house overnight. We could buy companies, but it is faster and 
less expensive to do a joint venture. We are typically doing equity-based joint ventures, and we negotiate 




Appendix A: LLG Exemplar Acquisitions 
 






Year Target Primary 
Industry 
Global Branding Phase 
1 Logistic Control Services (LCS) UK Europe Developed Listed 1999 T/S/S Pre-Global Rebranding 
2 Intercontinental Transport Services Singapore Asia Developed — 2005 T/S/S Pre-Global Rebranding 
3 Neptune Worldwide Transport US North America Developed — 2005 T/S/S Pre-Global Rebranding 
4 USLogistics US North America Developed Listed 2005 T/S/S Pre-Global Rebranding 
5 Logistique Suisse Switzerland Europe Developed Listed 2006 T/S/S During-Global Rebranding 
6 ConceptLogistics  UK Europe Developed — 2006 T/S/S During-Global Rebranding 
7 Multiplicity Logistics Singapore Asia Developed — 2007 T/S/S During-Global Rebranding 
8 Multiplex Logistics Singapore Asia Developed — 2007 T/S/S During-Global Rebranding 
9 Express-Logistics US North America Developed — 2007 T/S/S During-Global Rebranding 
10 Globe-Logistics US North America Developed — 2007 T/S/S During-Global Rebranding 
11 Southeast Asian Logistics Thailand Southeast Asia Emerging Listed 2008 T/S/S Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 
12 ChinaLogistics China Asia Emerging Listed 2008 T/S/S Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 
13 IndiaLogistics India Southeast Asia Emerging Listed 2008 Construction Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 
14 EuroLogistics Denmark Europe Developed Listed 2008 T/S/S Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 
15 Logistica Espagnia Spain Europe Developed — 2008 T/S/S Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 
16 Petro-Logistics Canada North America Developed Listed 2008 T/S/S Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 
17 Move-It-Logistics US North America Developed — 2008 T/S/S Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 
18 Logistique Française France Europe Developed Listed 2008 T/S/S Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 
19 Sub-Saharan Logistics Kenya Africa Emerging — 2008 T/S/S Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 
20 S-Logistics China Asia Emerging — 2008 T/S/S Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 
21 Logistica Brasilia Brazil Latin America Emerging — 2009 T/S/S Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 
22 Scandinavian Transport Services Finland Europe Developed Listed 2009 T/S/S Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 
23 Inter-Logistics Mexico N/Latin America Emerging — 2009 T/S/S Post-GR/ Global Financial Crisis 





Note(1): Interview informants were management team members with organizational tenure throughout the transformation phases.   
Note(2): EMNC acquiring firm and all acquired/target firm names are pseudonyms.      
Note(3): Emerging market acquisitions are in italics.      
Note(4): T/S/S refers to transportation, shipping and storage as the target primary industry.      
Note(5): Acquisitions are selected as exemplars for identity transformation.   
Note(6): Acquisitions are a subset of the 150+ full and partial acquisitions and joint ventures enacted from 1997-2016 and are further a subset during the 
pivotal 2004-2009 metamorphic time range, during which 100+ acquisitions occurred and 40 were of leading and historic global brands—The firm has 
continued with its acquisitions program from privatization in 1997 through the present, and we focus on the particular time range of pivotal 
internationalization and identity transformation.      
Note(7): Acquisitions occurring within the Arabian Gulf or Middle East region were omitted, as our investigation focuses on acquisitions into developing and 
developed economies outside the region.      
Note(8): Acquisitions are identified as publicly listed or privately held based on information provided by the focal firm.  
 
